whose main work since 1970 has been to run courses in project appraisal for nationals from the Third World. The contents reflect the Centre's concern not only with the techniques of project appraisal but also with the social and political issues raised by using them. Planning techniques such as project appraisal or mathematical programming are means to assist decision-making in conditions of incomplete information: there is no way of controlling the weather so that agricultural yields can be predicted with certainty, of estimating the likely success of trade unions in raising the real wages of their members, or of predicting technological changes in the electronics industry in the coming lO years. Project appraisal can be defined as any planning technique where investment decisions are taken one by one: it is decentralised in space and time. Consequently project appraisers operate with a special form of uncertainty: they do not know what other projects will be accepted in the future. By contrast, mathematical programmers attempt to plan all the investments that will be made in a defined time period simultaneously: this means that they require accurate technical and price information for every possible alternative investment or combination of investments, so that their plans very quickly become out of date. The macro-economic plans produced for the past 30 years in the mixed economies of both the developed and the underdeveloped worlds were neither of these: for often the planners had little control over those who took the actual decisions to invest, so that the so-called plans were little more than lists of half-prepared suggestions prevented as bait to persuade aid donors or the private sector that it was worth investing.
As with any decentralised planning system, project planning has two stages: establishing the rules Mirrlees system went out of its way to recommend that, as far as possible, this ratio should be calculated separately for each non-traded good). Both systems also allowed for the fact that a very low shadow price of labour might lead to the choice of labour intensive projects which would not be the projects generating the greatest profits for their owners, so that their implementation would lower the capacity of the economy to reinvest out of profits; so in countries where growth was emphasized as well as the need to raise consumption and employment immediately, a somewhat higher shadow wage was recommended.
The similarity between the Little-Mirrlees and UNIDO methods was recognised at once (Dasgupta 1972 The second general type of problem with project appraisal relates to the difficulty of tracing all the effects of a project through the economy. This is 4 connected with the problem of putting a boundary around a project: if one is to apply the methodology one has to put a limit on the types of impact that will be considered. A discussion of this question of externalities has been provided by Stewart (1977) , who points out that they will be more important for big projects in small countries, and more important if a whole group of projects, or a whole category of expenditure, is being compared, than if one small project is involved. Thus social cost-benefit analysis is most useful for evaluating relatively small projects in a country where strategy is clearly defined. It is potentially misleading if it is used to evaluate a proposed change in policy, or to compare one strategy with another. In industries with large numbers of interlinkages it will fail to pick up all the relevant price changes; for example a new power station may make electricity cheaper and this would affect the prices of a wide range of non-traded goods. A similar problem arises if a rise in the price of food will raise the shadow wage and so affect the shadow price of every non-traded good (Mirrlees 1978: 135) . In theory these problems, and others like them, should be handled by solving a general equilibrium system in which the government would maximise a suitable objective function subject to given technical conditions, and constraints on the availability of resources, so that for every good there would be a resulting shadow price. The set of projects that maximised 'profit' with these shadow prices would be the ones chosen for Income distribution weighting was taken off the shelf where it lay for 15 years in response to a sudden realisation by the World Bank and other Western interests that they had to do something to improve the conditions of life of the poorest 20 per cent of the world's population.
On the other hand, no-one appears to have 
